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The economics of wages and wages policy 
in the depression and recovery period: 
distinctive elements in the New Zealand 
debate, 1931-1936 
A.M. Endres* 
This article discu..~ses distinctive features of the New Zealand debate on the economics 
of wages and wages policy from 1931 up to the restoration of compulsory arbitration 
in 1936. Local economic orthodoxy proffered advice which, consistent with Keynes 
(1936), turned on the need for a general real wage reduction effected mostly through 
currency devaluation, rather than through further money wage cuts. Dissenters were 
critical of currency devaluation; they stressed excessively generous unemployment 
relief, real wage 'overhang' and structural real wage distorttons. Tentative estimates 
of both aggregate real product wage and labour productivity changes demonstrate, 
prima facie, that at least one strand in the dissenting argument was defensible. 
1. Introduction • 
As James Holt ( 1986, pp.l85-89) explained, the nadir of the first 40 years of 
compulsory arbitration in New Zealand was reached in 1932 when the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act was amended radtcally to replace compulsory arbitration 
with voluntary arbit.ration and compulsory conciliation. Holt stressed the social and 
political nature of the events connected with wages and wages policy up until and 
including 1932. He did not advance beyond some cursory observations on real wages, on 
employment and on their interconnections with contemporary macroeconomic pol~cy. 
Indeed, contemporary debate on the economic consequences of wages policy in the 
depression and early recovery period has been neglected in the literature hitherto 
dominated either by historians (e.g. Stone 1963; Holt 1986) or by commentators with a 
prime interest in the evolution of the industrial relations system in vacuo (e.g. Hare 
1946; Woods 1963). 
In the closing pages of his book Compulsory arbitration Holt (1986, pp.185-86) 
referred to the "appalling" wage-cutting poltcy proposals implemented in 1931 as being 
due to the "employers' persuasive power [and] also [to] the persuasive power of economic 
orthodoxy". In doing so, he overlooked the importance of dtstinguishtng real wages from 
money wages. He related civil service money wage cuts, in particular, to the intellectual 
shackles forged on the minds of pol icymakers and their economic advisers - both of 
Department of Economics, University of Auckland Without ascribing responsibility, I 
should like to thank Geoff Bertran1, Gary Hawke, Dave Mare, Keith Rankin, an anonymous 
assessor and Pat Walsh for helpful comments and cnticism. 
2 A.M. Endres 
whom were obsessed with a balanced government budget in what he described as a "pre-
Keynesian age". However, it was not Holt's intention to thoroughly evaluate the 
substance of arguments for wage-cutting formulated by 'economic orthodoxy'. I shall 
demonstrate that the Belshaw-Copland-Tocker orthodoxy in New Zealand economics was 
entirely consistent in its wages policy advice with Keynes' prescriptions for wage and 
labour market adjustment in the years up to 1936 and in the General theory (1936) it~lf. 
This article proposes to provide an intellectual history of distinctive features of the 
New Zealand debate on the economics of wages policy from 1931 up to the restoration of 
compulsory arbitration in 1936. Reference will be made to relevant, although severely 
inadequate, contemporary data on prices and wages. Furthermore, I shall provide 
tentative estimates of real product wages and of labour productivity with a view to 
comparing and contrasting the accuracy of various contemporary claims made about the 
impact of wage levels and wages policy during this period (see Hawke, 1985a, chapter 7 
for discussion of the broad contours of New Zealand's cconom y from 193 1 -1936). 
2. Orthodox wages policy advice in New Zealand in the early 
1930s: its consistency with Keynes' proposals 
At first glance, what is striking to anyone familiar with New Zealand economic 
thought on wages policy during the inter-war period is the scant attention given to the 
contemporary, highly amplified real wage- employment debate in Britain <Casson 1983; 
Garside 1987). Some reasons for such local neglect might have been that in Britain, 
unlike New Zealand, trade union membership was high and there was no centralised wage 
fixing institution. Also, the British economy, compared with the New Zealand 
economy, v. as not as dependent on export income. As is well known, Keynes' General 
theory de.alt predominantly with the closed economy case. 
Keynes (1936, pp.262, 270) ins is Led firstly, in respect of money wages, that if: 
we arc dealing with an unclosed system, and the reduction of money-wages is a 
reduction relarively lo mone)-wages abroad ... it is evident that the change v.ill 
be favourable to investment, since it will tend to increase the balance of trade. 
[Keynes' emphasis]. 
s~ondly, h~ maintained that v.' hile "a stable general level of money-v. ages is on a 
balance of considerations. the most advisable policy for a closed system" such a 
conclu~ion would not hold good for a more open economy unless "equilibrium v. 1th the 
rest of the v. orld can be secured by means of fluctuating exchanges". On lhe basis of 
these 2 observation alone, given both Nev.' Zealand's small open economy in the 1930s 
and 1ts stable exchange rate regime, policy-induced reductions in Lhe general ]e\ el of 
money wages or nuctuation. in money v. ages could '"'tiH be regarded as soluuons 
Keynes would have offered to insufficient investment and mass unemployment, other 
relevant factors 1e.g. the Coreign exchange rate) rem:Hning unchanged. 
Turning to Keyn ~· po "'ition on real v. age" before and after publication of the General 
the or_,, it i.: c1ear that he fully a epted the mi roeconomic basis of pre-Ke) nes1an or 
classtcal labour n1arkct docLrine. That is, Keynes accepted lhe proposition that, gtven 
otht:r fa tor inpub, the marginal product of labour v. ould diminish as emplo) ment 
expanded (Keynes, 1936, pp.l7-19). Therefore, ~ ilh dimini-hing returns raistng the 
~upply pri e of increa-ed output, funher employment re~quired real v. age reducuons. 
Keyne: (1936, p.17) did not di"'pute the key las"'ical po"'tulate lhat "an increa e in 
cn1ployn1rnt can only oc ur to the a on1panimenL of ad line in lhe rate of re.al y. s". 
The •.::uc Cor Ke) nr: \\a" hO\ bc '"' t to bring u h a ~oduction about. Hov-e r thts 
~ wtcment should not be made v. ilhout equi ation. It \\ not untillhe late 19~ that 
Ke) ne ... ian", c. JX~riaH) Joan Robin n, arne to enlpha-L that in an eoonom) op ng 
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well below capacity and possibly in conjunction with rapid technical change, the 
marginal product of labour could rise (and its marginal cost fall) as output expanded. 
Increasing returns to labour might then yield a positive relationship between employment 
and the real wage (see Garside 1987, p.80). 
As early as 1931 Keynes agreed that in the short-term general money wage cuts could 
not easily be used to reduce real wages (Casson, 1983, p.l62). Instead he favoured a rise 
in the general level of consumer prices above the rate of money wage growth (Keynes, 
1936, p.264). The lesson for policymakers following Keynes' prescription was to 
engineer a rise in product demand or, alternatively, find some other mechanism (e.g. an 
exchange rate devaluation), which would raise output prices relative to money wages. 
Real wages would then fall and employment increase (Garside, 1987, pp.77-79). 
Economic orthodoxy in New Zealand, represented by the Economic Committee 
convened in 1932, held that a general real wage reduction was a prior condition for 
recovery and a rise in employment. The Committee comprised economists Hight and 
Tocker (Canterbury), Copland (Melbourne), Belshaw (Auckland) and Park (Treasury). To 
ensure a real wage reduction they prescribed state regulated money wage cuts together 
with a package to deflate domestic pnces and a devaluation of the New Zealand currency 
(Park dissenting on the latter).! The Report of the Economic Commiuee [ REC] ( 1932) 
re inforced wage policy initiatives taken during 1931. These initiatives, the 
accompanying government rationalisation as well as contemporary debate, deserve a brief 
• 
fCVleW. 
The Finance Act 1931 empowered the Arbitration Court to amend all awards at 
intervals of 6 months until expiry of the Act in late 1932. The Court was required to 
Lake into account "economic and financial conditions" affecting New Zealand. 
Accordingly, after considering workers' and employers' submissions, the Court issued a 
general order reducing money wages and awards by 10 percent. The workers' submissions 
generally "showed no real grasp of real wages as opposed to money wages"; they "did not 
realise or would not admit" that provided consumer prices fell commensurately with 
wages, purchasing power would remain unaltered (Belshaw, 1934, pp.47-50). The report 
of the No Wages Reduction Conference (New Zealand Alliance of Labour, 1931) 
confinns these observations. Some concern was shown for casual workers who had 
already suffered substantial reductions in working hours, although the logic advanced -
that no wage sacrifices were warranted for those fully employed because casual workers 
were already making sacrifices - was hardly credible or consistent with a fair distribution 
of burdens within the labour movement (ibid., pp.12,14). In one submission to the 
Court, the Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners was on fmner 
ground when he speculated, without supporting numerical data, that real wage 
stabilisation through a money wage reduction did not compensate workers for recent or 
continuing increases in labour productivity. Other effective submissions pointed to the 
negative psychological impact of wage reductions on workers' productivity, and on the 
efficiency of employers who, with general wage reductions, would have less incentive to 
reduce other costs (Belshaw, 1934, pp.49-50). 
The Arbitration Court had not expressly wanted to reduce real wages; it desired merely 
to stabilise them. The Government, according to the 1931 Budget, was faced with 
rapidJy rising unemployment, substantially lower national income and a continuing 
decline of consumer prices and export prices. Contemporaneously, money wages had 
1 For an account of the development of economic policy advice up to the formation of the 
Economic Committee see Endres (forllicoming). At one point Holt (1986, p.l87) 
observed that Auckland economist Belshaw "put forward convincing rebuttals" of the 
argument that the Arbitration Court's award structure "raised costs by keeping wages 
high". This correctly reported Belshaw's views up to 1931. Belshaw along with other 
orthodoy economists favoured state dictated real wage reductions from 1931. 
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been maintained, and wages could prospectively be increased further in real terms if the 
Court did not act. The REC estimated that real national income fell by 10-15 percent 
during 1930 and 1931. The unemployment rate more than doubled from approximately 5 
percent of the labour force to 12 percent in that time. Between 1928 and 1932 export 
prices fell by 43 percent and retail prices by 11 percent. On the other hand, without the 
10 percent statutory wage reduction of 1931, money wages would have declined by 2 
percent between 1928 and 1932 (Economic Committee, 1932, p.81). The question for 
policymakers, therefore, was 
whether a steadily increasing nwnber of men were to receive higher real wages 
while a large and increasing number of their fellow workers were to have no 
wages at all, or whether real wages were to be kept at the same level as 
heretofore, with a consequent revival of business and employment (New Zealand 
Government, 1931, p.14, emphasis added). 
In mid-1931 then, the Government's aim was to maintain real wages rather than allow 
them to rise as product prices declined further. Such a policy was predicated on the 
supposition that real wage maintenance would stimulate investment and employment. 
The economic theoretic basis of this policy, if there was to be one, would hardly have 
been endorsed either by Keynes before 1936, or Keynes (1936), or by any so-called 
'classical' economist including A. C. Pigou - all of whom prescribed real wage reductions 
(by differing mechanisms however), in such circumstances as New Zealand faced. New 
Zealand wages policy during 1931 had some resemblance to the Australian case where an 
attempt was made to fix real wages by legislation. Keynes (1936, pp.269-70) 
disapproved of the Australian strategy. New Zealand economist Condliffe, along with a 
group of 'Canterbury School' academics, were more sympathetically disposed toward the 
real wage maintenance objective, at least in early 1931 before further falls of export 
prices changed their view. Condliffe (1931, p.494), reporting guardedly to the 
International Labour Organisation, considered real wage maintenance possible but 
contingent on the prices of world agricultural commodities stabilising at their 1931 
level. Further price declines would necessitate a fall in real wages. Canterbury 
economists (Hight, Tacker and Lawn) did not see a general real wage reduction as 
necessary or inevitable, at least in January 1931 (see the Canterbury Chamber of 
Commerce Economic Bulletin, No.72, 1931, p.3). 
It was not until February 1932 that orthodox economists in New Zealand came fully 
to propose a real wage reduction policy as part of a macroeconomic depression 
adjustment and recovery package. The adjustment strategy was designed to "secure a 
speedy and equitable distribution" of national income losses borne from 1929 to 1932 
(Economic Committee, 1932, p.lO). Some sectors of the economy, notably 
agriculturally based exporters, had shared disproportionately more of the burden than 
other income groups including rentiers, public servants and workers generally. A 
comparison between the trend of export prices and all domestic prices (including interest 
rates) up to 1932 formed the empirical basis for this conclusion. The REC therefore 
demanded imperiously that some semblance of equity be reached to ensure, using the 
contemporary euphemism, "equality of sacrifice" between various income groups. To 
effect the outcome, widespread state intervention in the economy was recommended to 
spread the burden of income losses especially toward non-exporting or 'sheltered' sectors 
of the domestic economy. Internal prices were to be deflated; rents and interest rates by 
20 percent and money wages possibly by up to 10 percent in addition to reductions that 
had already occurred in 1931. An uncompromising conservative domestic deflationist 
programme was avoided by a recovery package which raised sales taxes by 10 percent and 
raised export prices expressed in local currency terms through a substantial devaluation of 
the New Zealand pound. (The example used in the REC was a 40 percent deviation from 
sterling parity). By raising exporters' money receipts the devaluation would both reduce 
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th~ extenl to whi h inttmal deflation (including money wage deflation) was nt cessary t > 
pr ad in on1e lo scs and encourage an export-led recovery in national incornc. 01 
cour e, c port growth would be further enhanced by wage and interest rate r~du tion 
ince exporters' costs \vould tend to fall. Real wages would also fall bccau ~ with n1 >n y 
wages held con tant or cut further, dorncslic prices would tend to rise as a r su it of th 
al ta and the devaluation. Th~ rc onunt;ndations in the R EC ~tere eventually 
u11plen1entcd, although devaluation (of 25 percent against sterling) had to wait until 
January 1933. The National Expcnditun:, Adjusunent Act (~tay 1932) did not carry 
through th R EC's suggestion of a general 10 per e rH n1oncy wage cut. IL n1ovcd only 
to in1posc cut" in ci vii service wages on a graduated scale from 5 percent to 12.5 pcrct;nl. 
RcnlS and a wide r:angc of fixed intcr'st charges w~rc reduced by approxirnatcly 20 pt'r cnt 
{Bdsh tw, 1933, pp.766-69). While cotnplicatcd hy son1e offsetting factors such a 
lo\\ cr rents, low r n1ongagc in tercst charges and sonH: downward price pressure on 
locally produ d (and consun1ed) goods as r 'al wag costs fell, the intended nctl ffect of 
the R EC poli y packag wa a IO't't'Cr level of real wages. 
A rt:al wage reduction was intended by th R EC for 2 n1ain n:asons. Firstly, for 
tmn1ed1atc cri is adju tn1ent purposes, in keeping with the prevailing n1orality of 
equality of acrific ', \vage and salary earners should. on the RECis r~ckoning. share 
further in tl1c burd n, assist in internal cost rcdu tion and thereby arrest the fall in 
nauonal H1con1e rendered to the export sector. Secondly, for recover) purposes a real 
wage redu uon had en1ployn1cnt prornoting bene fits. The view of the Econon1ic 
Con1n1illcc wa~ that the level of aggregate national incon1e was "one of tht.: n1ain 
detern1inant of the wage level'' (Copland, 1 Q32, p.89). t¥1tcro-lcvcl, n1arginal 
productivlly consad rations (e.g., at the industry level) were in1poru1nt, but of less 
rele' d.n c Jn tl1c en is circun1st.ancc of 1912. A passage in the REC captures both en sis 
ad justin nt and recovery argun1cnts for a general rc·11 wage reduction: 
E port prices ha' e fallen rnuch n1ore than import pri es ... The real income of 
the commumty fron1 the point of view of the con.:-;umer is the goods and services 
av alablc for consmnption. These goods and sen icc.s arc made up of home 
production le s e ports pi us imporLs. The val ume of impons has fallen 
substantially and for the prCI\Cnt hom~..:-produ tion ... has dcciincd. The Iauer 
n1ay be restored, but the forn1er cannot until import prH .. es fall relatively Lo 
e port price . Hence the con1munity has kss rt'al income ... and the decline is 
.still going on. 1n these circun1stances it is clt'ar that a decline in wages both 
monc) and real is inevitable at least for a tim~.: (E onomic Contmittcc, 1932, 
p. 2 ). 
lL hould be rcn1ernbcrcd that in the early 1930s nc·1.rly half the national income Y.'as 
produc d bye port rs (Econornic Cornrnittce, 1933, p.4). ~1orcovcr, indirectly, the 
Lcm1 of trnd were th ref ore a prime inllucn on the real wage level. The REC Look for 
granled tl1e c ntrality of exporL grO\\ th in ·tny plan for recovery. \Vith the exception of 
Fi h r, no economi t entertained the pro pect of a consumption-led recovery and/or of 
home-produ tion, in hlding public \\Ork activity and extensive import substitution, 
leading Ne\v Zealand's recovery. Keynes did not sec any prospect for basiP.g New 
Zealand' recovery on these activities (Keynes, 1983, p.438). 
Altogeth r, the po~ition of New Zealand's ~ onon1ic orthodoxy may be characterised 
as follow . In the ~hort-Lcnn, cnlploynlcnL L xpansion in the crisis adjustment phase was 
predicated on cheaper n1oncy, lower intcn1al costs, including a lower real wage level, and 
devaluation. Ceteri~ poribus, national incon1c, especially exporters' share of income, 
would th n tabilise and recovery bccorne more likely allhough not guaranteed. In the 
rnediun1-tenn, cn1ployn1ent would expand further in the rc-covef)' phase as aggregate 
dcrnand 1ncrca d initially as a result of bcnefi ial foreign trade multipliers. Partly, such 
n1ult•pher "ould be n1ade favourable by the devaluation and partly by hoped Cor 
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exogenous rises in agricultural commodity prices. A crucial pre-condition for real wage 
rises, according to orthodox economists, was an improvement in the terms of trade and an 
expansion of national income generated in the export sector. 
3. Dissenters from orthodox wages policy advice: Murphy and 
Fisher 
The 1932 amendment to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act removed 
compulsory arbitration from the statute books. The Act heralded the beginning of a 
process which eroded the award system until it was resuscitated by legislation in 1936. 
The economic advantages of this move were promoted by its (political) proponents as 
facilitating greater labour market allocative efficiency but these advantages were not 
considered important by orthodox economists (Ross, 1932). Belshaw (1933, p.766) (see 
aJso Riches, 1933, p.634 and Ross, 1932), for instance, railed against the amendment, 
maintaining in the case of strong unions that 
there is no reason to suppose that awards will be any more elastic ... Since trade 
unionism tends to be strongest in the more important industries, little 
advantage seems likely to accrue which could not have accrued equally under 
compulsory arbitration. 
Wellington economist B.E. Murphy pursued the possibilities for greater labour 
market flexibility suggested by the 1932 amendment. His case was identical to that 
which he made in 1928 at the National Industrial Conference (Murphy, 1928). Small, 
weak unions of skilled workers as well as less enterprising employers would be 
disadvantaged by t.he amendment. Murphy (1932) implied t.hat there would be some 
changes in wage relativities, possibly narrower margins for skilL Since real and money 
wages in Murphy's (1932, p.10) assessment were unacceptably rigid downwards, he 
seized on the opportunity to praise policies which potentially made wages both more 
variable and more responsive to labour productivity. However, he did not provide 
estimates of productivity changes to indical.e how the Arbitration Court's wage setting 
procedures previously deviated from remunerating labour on a productivity basis. The 
compelling reason for mass unemployment which appeared in early 1931 was "a lack of 
adjustment between t.he market value of labour and the market value of the product of 
labour" (Murphy, 1931, p. 7). Such a 'lack of adjustment' was in Murphy's estimation 
due to the upward push on the 'market value of labour' exerted by t.he Arbitration Act's 
award system. Employers responded to higher product wages in the 1930s by reducing 
their demand for labour. 
Central to what Casson (1983, p.24) calls "pre-Keynesian" explanations of 
unemployment in inter-war Britain (offered by Pigou and Clay) were long-run real wage 
rigidity on the demand side and relatively high levels of unemployment benefits on the 
supply side. In New Zealand, Murphy's ( 1931, p.9) argument also turned on these 
factors, alt.hough it was modtfted to su it local institutions established to administer 
unemployment relief. Real wages were rigid downwards, so his argument proceeded, 
both because of compulsory arbitration and the associated award structure which focussed 
invariably on cost-of-living adjustments instead of productivity changes, and because of 
egregiously generous public unemployment relief schemes. Murphy forgot to mention 
that a flat., regressive levy on all wages had been used partly to finance these schemes up 
to 1932 (and fully to finance them from early 1932). (For a further analysis of 
unemployment policy in the 1930s see Endres and Jackson, 1989). According to Murphy 
( 1930, p.5), 
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the State, by elaborate and costly unemployment relief works, has made 
provision in great part for the needs of these [unemployed] men, and so far has 
succeeded in preventing their compctilion for jobs from breaking down standard 
[wage J rates. 
To unemployment relief, Murphy attributed certain recidivist tendencies which 
accompany any "so called social services". Thus, such relief schemes "undermine the 
morale of our people, inhibit saving ... hinder habits of self-reliance" and raise workers' 
reservation wage (ibid., p.30 and 1931, p.6). A similar but less oblique supply side 
argument was recently made by Benjamin and Kochin ( 1979) which purported to show 
that a high unemployment benefit/wage ratio in Britain was responsible for much inter-
war unemployment. Murphy (1931, p.9) was hostile not only to the general level of 
unemployment relief (rather than the benefit/wage ratio); he opposed many other forms of 
public expenditure. He asserted significant crowding-out effects on private spending. 
Murphy's supply side argument was strong on assertion, but weak by modem standards 
in demonstrating any link between unemployment relief and wage setting structures. 
More recent soctal and labour hisLory research on the nature of unemployment relief in 
the 1930s provides an effective retort to this aspect of "pre-Keynesian" labour market 
analysis (e.g., Robertson, 1982). On the demand side, Murphy's view remains open to 
testing. 
Although Murphy's supply-side argument might have been suspect, another 
dissenting perspective on the economics of wages and labour was more in tune with New 
Zealand's economic circumstances. A.G .B. Fisher, Professor of Economics at the 
University of Otago and sometime student of Edwin Cannan (a leading economist at the 
London School of Economics), offered an alternative analysis of labour market 
adjustment problems 1n the 1930s. In not sharing the aggregative outlook of economic 
orthodoxy, Fisher was led to develop an altemauve structural disequilibrium perspective 
of the labour market 
Keynes (1936) argued that mass involuntary unemployment could be reduced by 
inflating product prices faster than money wages, thereby reducing real wages. The REC 
adopted this approach as early as 1932. Of course, Keynes (1936, p.17) assumed the 
existence of widespread money illusion and a given state of "organisation, equipment and 
technique" -assumptions that the REC was also implicitly to mtJce for the New Zealand 
case. In revtewing the REC, Fisher ( 1932a) did not dispute that the average real wage 
was too high though he resolutely refused to accept first, that the Economic Committee 
had arrived at some scientifically acceptable formula for reducing real wages and second, 
that a blanket real wage reduction was economically desirable. His argument turned on 
. . 
mtcrocconomtc tssues: 
A 10 percent all round reduction [in real wages] may be necessary, but it is beuer 
to admit that the proportionate reduction of income which is proposed [in the 
REC] is merely a matter of expediency, and not a means of ensuring equality of 
sacrifice. Nor ... is it clear why ... we should insist on exactly proportional 
wage reductiOns in all industries ... [Where] normal profits are being earned ... 
theory suggests no obvious reasons why wages should be as severely cut as in 
depressed industries (1932a, p. 77). 
Fisher's contribution to the wages policy debate stressed the need to promote far-
reaching structural change. Unlike Murphy, Fisher (1933a, p.704) considered that the 
Arbjtration Court's responsibility for "imposing rigidity on the -~dustrial structure was 
often exaggerated". Unemployment was more often a result of policy induced sectoral 
real wage rigidity, a related insufficient mobility of labour engaged in depressed 
agriculturally based industries an<L more fundamentally, world-wide secular decline in the 
prospects for agricultural commodity production. Abolition of compulsory arbitration 
was not in Fisher's view economically consequential. More serious was the mistaken 
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advice in the REC which, indirectly, bolstered the demand for agricultural workers - a 
sector which was in secular decline. Resources on the margin would flow into the 
agricultural sector especially if devaluation was implemented. Politically, vested 
interests would be supported by such a move and economically, further obstacles created 
to making productivity and technological improvements in agriculture (necessitated by 
the older, higher exchange rate). Furthermore, advice in the REC would slow the 
movement of labour into potentially more productive and more highly remunerative 
work in urban tertiary industries. In the crisis of the 1930s, exhorting workers to go 
back to the land,' coupled with policies designed to provide incentives for them to do so, 
were in Fisher's view not well-founded. The world economy was already weighed down 
by a glut of raw agricultural commodities and the demand for such commodities was lx>th 
price and income inelastic (Fisher, 1932a; 1932c ). Fisher believed that the economic 
crisis heralded a permanent structural change rather than a temporary fluctuation in the 
fortunes of agriculture. 
Policies of labour transference in the 1930s were allegedly inimical to the long-tenn 
development of urban industries in New Zealand. They focussed on shifting the burden 
of urban unemployment relief toward demeaning land-based subsistence work schemes 
with little or no skill acquisition component. The structural adjustment problem was 
therefore likely to be compounded, especially in the economic recovery, since most of 
the unemployed remained unskilled (Fisher 1930; 1932a, p.86). Public investment in 
human resources was the main long-term remedy for structural mal-adjustment since it 
enhanced labour mobility. Moreover, more tertiary education had favourable income 
distribution effects because it tended to compress wage cliffcrentials for skill in the long-
term (Fisher, 1932b). 
According to Fisher, sectoral real wage rigidity was the most formidable problem 
facing New Zealand's labour market in the 1930s. The macroeconomic policy package 
proposed in the REC and implemented by the Government, reinforced these rigidities, 
initially favouring movement of labour into relatively low-paid work in agriculture, to 
the detriment of workers' living standards in the long-term. Microeconomic policy in the 
labour market was underdeveloped and lacking in vigilant authoritative government 
initiatives where they were most needed, namely in reducing the costs and expancling the 
supply of educational services. In reviewing Hicks' Theory of wages (1932), Fisher 
(1933b, pp.140-41) encountered "complete neglect of the factors which limit the supply 
of labour for the more remunerative types of work" and he questioned the validity of 
assuming wage equalisation for workers of equal efficiency in different occupations. 
Hicks devoted too much attention to the interference of trade unions in the "normal 
adaptations" of labour markets to the forces of supply and demand and too little attention 
to correcting "the dislocating effects of the chronic restriction upon the supply of highly-
paid labour which are imposed by narrow social and education policy". 
Fisher's ideas were never in the ascendancy in policy debate during the 1930s. Their 
empirical validity was difficult to falsify, then as now. His assertion that real wages 
were too high ex post (or even ex ante) in the 'declining' agricultural sector might be 
assessed by comparing unemployment/vacancy ratios by industry in the 1930s. 
However, the relevant data are non-existent. It may be established from qualitative 
sources that there was Significant structural unemployment and 'surplus' subsistence 
labour in the 'declining' sector and at the same time, comparatively few vacancies in the 
urban secondary and tertiary tndustries. Of course, the latter would be contrary to 
Fisher's observations on the labour market in the 1930s. That would not invalidate 
Fisher's assertion of downward, sectoral real wage rigidity. Structural unemployment and 
'surplus' subsistence agricultural labour may persist while unfilled vacancies in the more 
buoyant sectors of the economy are eliminated by upward wage movements. Moreover, 
in the case of upward wage rigidity, 'pre-Keynesian' labour economics (of the kind 
developed by Ptgou, Clay and Cannan) would have asserted that there was 'surplus' 
subsistence labour in the 'declining' sector which choked off demand for labour in other 
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sectors ripe for recovery through the spillover effects of lower incomes (Casson, 1983, 
p.ll). 
Overall, cogent arguments which dissented from orthodox economic advice in New 
Zealand were offered but not generally accepted by policymakers. These arguments had 3 
main features. Depression unemployment was: 
(i) caused by real wages set by the Arbitration Court being well above the 
level of labour prcxluctivity (Murphy); 
(ii) caused by public expenditure on unemployment relief which remunerated 
labour in excess of equivalent market rewards for work of the same nature 
and which displaced more productive private employment by crowding out 
private spending (Murphy); and 
(iii) inter-connected with the problem of the real wage which was acute in the 
declining sector of the economy. Specific macroeconomic policies aimed 
at nurturing primary commodity exports combined with ineffective 
microcconomic policies exacerbated the structural real wage problem 
(Fisher). 
4. Review and tentative compilation of available evidence 
In prescribing an across-the-board real wage reduction the Economic Committee was 
well aware that the positive impact of a suggested devaluation of the New Zealand pound 
on exporters' incomes and ultimately on employment growth may have been neutralised 
by wage bargaining.2 Presumably that is why the REC suggested a further 10 percent 
general money wage reduction to take effect in 1932. The fate of the Arbitration Court 
and the award system was not sealed when the REC was compiled. Once compulsory 
arbitration was abolished later in 1932 it was perhaps reasonably assumed by 
policymakers that the REC's money wage cut suggestion was rerlundant since it could be 
effected by allowing private employers to breakdown awards in an ad hoc manner. The 
second report of the Economic Committee (1933, p.22) saw in the abolition of 
compulsory arbitration an opportunity to minimise money wage reductions by relying 
on an exchange rate devaluation to effect a reduction in the average real wage. With only 
compulsory conciliation in force, failure of either party to agree in an industrial dispute 
resulted tn a lapsed award. It is not clear from the evidence presented below whether, as 
the REC wished, real wages were in fact reduced by "a further 10 percent" (Economic 
Committee, 1932, p.28) between 1932 and 1936. As Table 1 shows, real product wages 
fell by about 7 percent between 1932 and 1935 and real income wages probably feii by 
no more than 2 percent after allowing for tax increases from 1932 to finance 
unemployment relief. By real product wages we mean the cost of labour to producers, 
that is, weekly ordinary time money wages adjusted for the movement in output prices. 
By real income wages we mean weekly ordtnary time money wages adjusted for changes 
in retail prices and changes in income tax rates. From 1932 and before 1937, average 
real income wages for males declined to their lowest level in 1935, but still only 0.58 
percent below their 1932 level; and for females in 1935, only 0.092 percent below their 
1932 level. The impact of a higher unemployment relief tax in mid-1932 would hardly 
. 
2 This is not the place to consider the devaluation neutralising effects of other factors. 
Economic recovery following devaluation was also retarded by the passing of the Banks 
Indemnity Act (1933). For the latest evidence on this crucial matter. sec Maguire (1988). 
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Table 1: Wages, prices and labour productivity 1921-1936 
























































































Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook (various) and Report of the Economic Committee 
(1932 p.41). 
Notes: 1. Limitations of this series as a measure of output prices are explained in the New 
Zealand Official Yearbook (1937, p.657). Exclusion of transportation and elec-
tricity prices is particularly limiting. 
2. Nominal wage index divided by wholesale price index. 
3. An index derived from Table 3 (below) taking real GDP per person employed in 
1926 = 1000. 
4. Percentage deviation between the real product wage and labour productivity. 
have decreased real income wages by more than 2 percent (Hare 1946, p.103, Table 1 ). 
The Economic Committee (1933, p.22) in its second report, estimated that in January 
1933 "the real wages of workers in full employment are now about the same as 1929." I 
am driven to conclude that from 1932 notwithstanding, despite both further cuts in civil 
service wages and salaries and the abolition of compulsory arbitration, real wages 
probably did not decline sufficiently to avoid neutralising some of the potential 
employment promoting benefits of the 1933 devaluation. 
My tentative estimates of the trend of real wage 'overhang' in the period under review 
deserve more detailed consideration. Following Pope (1982, p.114) I defme 'overhang' as 
the deviation between the real product wage and productivity, which may be written 
without time derivatives: 
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OH = ( ~ 
where OH - real wage 'overhang' -
w - money wage rate -
p 
- product (output) prices 
-
Q - real GDP -
N - employment -
This is monotonically related to effective labour cost (ELC) that is, the real wage 
adjusted for changes in the productivity of labour- a direct index of 'overhang': 
ELC= ( ;) 
• ( %) 
• 
The 1931 10 percent money wage cut was the catalyst for a continuing reduction in 
the real cost of labour to employers up to 1935. Combined with any real wage reducing 
effects of abolishing compulsory arbitration, my estimates demonstrate that the trend of 
real product wages was downwards from 1931, but it was probably not enough to 
eliminate rising real wage overhang which persisted throughout New Zealand's depression 
and early recovery years. Real GDP per person employed, which acts as our measure of 
labour productivity in Table 1 above, declined steadily from 1926 to 1933. Official data 
on weekly hours of work of the employed workforce do not seem to have been affected 
significantly by the economic crisis (New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1937, pp. 673-74). 
If actual hours of work had fallen this would have required a downward adjustment to our 
employment estimates, and therefore increased estimated productivity from the levels 
extrapolated from Table 1. It is likely, although no research evidence is yet available to 
support this supposition, that some of the decline in productivity can be explained by 
employers opting to 'hoard' labour during the depression because of plant indi visibilities, 
re-hiring costs and market uncertainty, despite a fall in product prices and product demand. 
Nonetheless, at the level of aggregation in these estimates, the positive percentage 
deviation of real product wages from productivity is remarkably large and not likely to be 
reversed by further upward revisions of the employment data (e.g. if data were available 
on the Maori employed workforce, 1921-36, our employment series would have been 
higher and productivity lower). 
At a lower level of aggregation, Hawke's (1985b, pp. 21-24) estimates show that 
there were differences among industries - some, for example butter and cheese factory 
workers) could pass a large wage 'overhang' burden on to farmers while maintaining 
output and employment In the boot and shoemaking industry) by contrast, a 'moderate' 
wage 'overhang' was created despite wage reductions which to some extent lowered the 
effective labour cost; employment w.as maintained at a relatively high level in the face of 
a decline in output prices. Murphy's strenuously argued conviction that rising effective 
labour cost had been a major factor responsible for weak labour demand and persistent 
unemployment in the early 1930s seemed to be based on a feeling about aggregate 
movements - about average effective labour cost relative to its level in the 1920s. My 
estimates in Table 1 show that Murphy's view was defensible. (To be sure, the micro-
level picture may have been more complicated. Murphy did not use the terms effective 
labour cost or 'overhang' although his disquisitions on wages contain notions of 
equivalent conceptual content). In Murphy's view, then, changes in the average effective 
labour cost had been detrimental to the employment of labour during the early depression 
years. He could be excused for ignoring the possibility that 'overhang' may have been 
largely a by-product of output fluctuations, since that issue may be regarded as beside the 
point given high unemployment and the need immediately to propose a solution. 
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Certainly Murphy did not claim that wage 'overhang' instigated the depression. He never 
favoured exchange rate devaluation as a route to recovery, so his argument was confined 
to insisting on the need to reverse the trend of rising average effective labour cost in order 
to increase the demand for labour. 
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1930 1933 1936 
484920 503815 512812 
444468 461567 472642 
474252 492731 502624 
(97.8) (97. 8) (98) 
120988 126931 136878 
(27.2) (27 .5) (29) 
595240 619662 639502 
20000 65000 55500 
575000 554500 584000 
Notes: 1. Here I strictly follow methods of estimation and estimates derived by Keith Ran-
kin, who kindly supplied these with his referee's report on an earlier version of my 
article, and whose expertise in this field is far greater than my own. However, it 
should be emphasised that he does not agree that any of the above estimates are a 
valid representation of the period under review. 
2. Sources: NZ Census 1921, 1926, 1933; estimates for other years NZ Population 
and Building Statistics, annual average, Europeans only. 
3. Sources: Bloomfield (1984, p. 144 ), which does not include the small employ-
ment 'unspecified' class, for 1921, 1926, 1933. Bloomfield compiles his data dir-
ectly from the NZ Census. For 1930 and 1933 the same participation rates as 1926 
for males and females are used (see Macrae and Sinclair, 1976, pp. 38-40). The fe-
male workforce interpolations for 1930 and 1933 usc Macrae and Sinclair in 2 
ways . First, for 1930, 10,000 (2500 per annum) arc added to the 1926 workforce 
figure. Second, for 1933, the Macrae and Sinclair participation rate of 27.5 
percent is used. 
4 . Census estimates for 1921, 1926 and 1936. For 1930 a conservative interpola-
tlOn (20,000) 1s made of unemployment between 1926 (13,000) and 1936 
(55,500). A less conservative estimate which added (say) 20,000 more to the un-
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employment total in 1930 would lead to a correspondingly lower employment 
figure for that year but would not significantly alter the wage 'overhang' trend as 
measured in Table 1. 
At the macro-level, there is evidence in the real product wage trend of a sharp real 
wage rise in advance of the depression ( 1926-1929) and a real wage fall in advance of 
recovery in 1932-1933. The fall measured prior to recovery was initiated by the 
Arbitration Court's general system of wage regulation - the 1931 10 percent general wage 
cut - but subsequent falls to 1935 were largely the result of leaving wage fixing to free 
wage bargaining, that is, to numerous sectional decisions unfettered by COfl}pulsory 
arbitration. It is ironic that if the government had accepted the REC's suggestion for a 
further 10 percent money wage cut in 1932 without diluting the powers of the 
Arbitration Court, wages would have been statutorily cut by another wage order. A 
reduction of this magnitude in 1932 would have been much greater than money wages 
were in fact reduced from I 932 up to the end of 1933, in a period when the Arbitration 
Court had been rendered near impotent In short, greater utilisation of the Arbitration 
Court's powers to make general wage orders could have facilitated greater aggregate wage 
flexibility than in fact occurred. Nominal wages fell by only 0.67 percent between 1932 
and 1935 inclusive in a period without compulsory arbitration (Hare, 1946, p.103). In 
Australia, by contrast, the centralised system of wage regulation throughout the 1930s 
was instrumental in securing nominal wage reductions large enough to preserve the 
exporter and encourage the manufacturer (see Gregory eta!., 1988, pp.400-404). What 
obtained in the depths of the depression and in the early recovery period was the creation 
of an incomes policy designed to g1ve exporters ar1 immediate income boost through 
devaluation. Labour was exposed to market-led wage bargaining; cost of living 
adjustments were dispensed with. The actual aggregate outcomes for employed labour-
only slight money wage flexibility and only slight real wage reductions - were certainly 
not those intended by policymakers. Hare (1946, p.11 0) concluded that there was "no 
great decline in labour's share [of nalional product] after ... 1932, which suggests that the 
Court of Arbitration had not been instrumental in keeping up wages at an artificially 
high level". However, Hare did not provide any estimates of productivity and wage 
'overhang'. His argument also presumed that decentralised wage bargaining from 1932 
would have quickly reduced wages below any 'artificial' level previously created by the 
Arbitration Court. 
Between 1926 and 1933, employment did not vary proportionately with output. 
Available employment estimates (see Table 2, above), coupled with nominal GDP 
estimates (Lineham, 1968), indicate respectively, that total employment increased by 
3.75 percent while GDP fell by 23 percent between 1926 and 1933 (and 1926 cannot be 
regarded as a year of exceptionally high capacity utilisation). While the output reduction 
was smaller in real tcnns ( -7 percent), these data are revealing because the fall in output 
did not result in a fall in total employment. Change in nominal GDP is calculated from 
Table 3, below. 
The change in real GDP (1926-1933) using 1926 as a base year, was -7 percent. 
Certainly, labour hoarding is suggested, as is a decline in the profit share of national 
income.3 Official hours of work indices were derived for a full week's work as written 
into awards. These hours did not alter from 1932 to 1936. Job sharing within firms was 
3 It may be proposed that an analysis of the degree of responsiveness of the profit share to 
changes in output (if the data were available) could explain wage 'overhang' as a mere by-
product of output fluctuations. Evidence available for Australia on this matter for the 
1920s and 1930s does not support this proposition (Pope. 1982. pp.116-124 ), although 
it is possible the New Zealand case may have been unique. 
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still important, however. The number of 'short-time' hours worked in factory production 
increased nearly 4-fold between 1930 and 1934 (Hare, 1946, p.127). Employers, along 
with the unemployed, bore a greater share of the burden of the output decline than the 
regular, employed workforce. Wage-fixing by those in regular jobs did not seem to be 
sensitive to the level of unemployment. Furthermore, my estimates suggest why 
employers "did not see quickly that in the 1930s production for the home market had 
risen in potential profitability relative to production for international markets" (Hawke, 
1987, p.l20). The expenditure switching benefits of the devaluation, for investment and 
for greater employment in domestic manufacturing production, were negated by 
persistent, historically high real wage 'overhang' (relative to the 1920s), as well as by the 
likelihood that employers were hoarding underemployed labour. 














































Notes: 1. Census years for employment; December years all other data. 
2 . See Table 2, above. 
3 . Source: Lineham (1968, p.l6). Two year averages are taken of Lineham's data in 
order to make his data more consistent with the December year basis of price and 
wage data. 
4 . Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook (various). 
5 . Nominal GOP adjusted for changes m retail prices. 
6 . Real GOP divided by total number of persons employed. 
That average real product wages were not more responsive to high levels of 
unemployment in the more dccenLralised wage fixing system prevailing between 1932 
and 1936, might be explained as a short-run phenomenon to do with the characteristics of 
the unemployed. It is possible that the unemployed in the 1930s were not close 
substitutes for those in regular employment, and any possibility of substitution would 
have declined the longer the duration of unemployment. Fisher would doubtless have 
offered this explanation. As we saw, Fisher complained about the negligible skill 
acquisition opportunities provided by relief schemes. Unfortunately. industry specific 
unemployment data arc not available for the 1930s. Extensive qualitative evidence 
suggests that the unemployed were mostly comparatively unskilled workers in the period 
under review. 
In the absence of data on sectoral shifts in labour requirements in the 1930s, I am able 
only to review relative wage movements. This task was originally and thoroughly 
completed by Riches (1936, pp.735-49). Riches reported that, far from reducing the 
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uniformity of wage movements across sectors, and far from widening wage rate 
dispersion, abolition of compulsory arbitration in 1932 was co-extensive with a 
narrowing of wage dispersion. Furthermore, while cancellation of many awards after 
I 932 "led to greater local variations in certain trades, the average dispersion of the wage 
rate indexes for different districts appear to have been little affected" (p.743). 
Nevertheless, as Murphy expected, margins for ski ll narrowed since smaller skilled 
unions were weakened without compulsory arbitration. On the other hand, Fisher's 
hypothesis that farm workers wages and wages in farm related industries would rise 
artificially relative to urban secondary and tertiary industries if the REC's recom-
mendations were implemented, appears lacking in empirical foundation. Farm workers' 
wages fell faster than other groups up to 1933 and increased more slowly than other 
groups from 1934 (Riches, 1936, p.743 and New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1937, 
p.667). This trend of wages in agriculture relative to other sectors both in depression and 
recovery docs, however, lend some support to his emphasis on the relative excess supply 
of agricultural labour. In Fisher's mind, agricultural workers' wages in the depression and 
recovery period may have still been relatively too high to encourage greater, more 
desirable urban drifL Maintenance of existing barriers to many forms of formal and on-
the-job education would not have helped free unskilled labour from a near subsis tence 
existence in rural areas. Data inadequacies do not permit refutation of Fisher's assertion 
that labour was being misdirected toward agriculture both by government unemployment 
relief and by the general direction of macroeconomic policy. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article I have demonstrated that there was much substance to the New Zealand 
debate on the economics of wages and wages policy in the 1930s. The line of orthodox 
economic argument whtch prevailed and was represented by the Economic Committee, 
favoured a large real wage reduction for crisis adJUStment and recovery purposes. The 
advice of the Committee on this matter - to raise output prices (especially for exports) 
relative to money wages - was entirely consistent with Keynes' policy prescriptions for 
an open economy. The open economy case was not central tn Keynes' deliberations in 
the General theory, but he nevertheless mentioned it frequently in passing. 
Taken as a whole, minority dissenting arguments offered by Murphy and Fisher were 
never generally in the ascendancy in local policy debate during the period under review. 
However, my tentative estimates suggest that Murphy's concern for the problem of real 
wage 'overhang' was defensible even if his view on the excessive generosity of 
unemployment relief as a cause of mass unemployment was perhaps astray. There 
appeared to be some force in Fisher's concern for the structural real wage problem, 
particularly his suggestion that government policies were contributing to an undesirable 
relative oversupply of agricultural labour. 
Research on the economics of wages and wages policy and on labour markets in New 
Zealand during the inter-war period is very much inchoate. In this article, I have been led 
by an historiographical interest to document competing arguments and, in the process, I 
have identified and assessed issues of the moment which moved those familiar with 
contemporary circumstances. Extending my line of inquiry into the era when Keynesian 
economic policies reigned supreme, especially the 1950s and 1960s. may also prove 
instructive. 
I 
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